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1 Introduction
In order to engage in a continuous social interaction, participants must be able to
dynamically understand, predict, and influence the mental states and actions, so
as to enable a process of efficient and interactive grounding of shared meaning.
We follow the argument that the mentalizing network and the mirror-neuron
system in our social brain together provide the basis for these abilities [1, 2].
However, how these systems exactly operate and how they work together is still
unclear. Building on previous work on the interplay of mentalizing and mirroring
in embodied communication, here we lay out next steps towards an embodied
hierarchical model of dynamic social behavior and cognition. The proposed next
steps target the early and reliable self-other distinction and integration in the
sensorimotor system, which in turn informs mentalizing, so that it can distin-
guish between own and other’s beliefs in complex situations of simultaneous
action perception and production. Also, we propose that social cognitive sys-
tems informed in such a way have the information to allow for strategic signal-
ing behavior by selecting actions necessary to make their action goals easier to
disambiguate, and thus to communicate efficiently and successfully.
2 Current model
In a first step towards this goal, we developed a model of two distinct networks of
the human social brain - mentalizing and mirroring - which allows them to inter-
act during embodied communication. The model connects a mentalizing system
based on simple heuristics for attributing and inferring different orders of belief
about own and other’s mental states, with a hierarchical predictive processing
model of online action perception and production based on the common coding of
underlying action representations [3]. To investigate the role of mentalizing and
mirroring interacting in inter-agent coordination and to test the model, we con-
ducted simulation experiments in which two virtual agents were each equipped
with this model. Different mentalizing capacity configurations were tested, as
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well as different noise conditions, thus influencing the robustness of the commu-
nication. The agents engage in non-verbal communication behavior to which the
embodied action representations in the mirroring system can resonate because
of their close coupling of perception and production, while taking uncertainty
from noise into account. Resonating action representations inform the mental-
izing system, which in turn can guide successful interaction. Results from our
simulations on this first model demonstrate how mentalizing can afford higher
robustness of communication by enabling interactive grounding processes.
3 Next steps
Although our model was able to act upon and infer beliefs about own and other’s
mental states, it could only produce or perceive an action at a time. Of course,
this is a special case of interaction that can occur, but in our dynamic world our
social brain has to cope with simultaneous interaction with multiple partners, as
well as simultaneous production and perception of actions. As a starting point
for an account of simultaneous action and perception, the first step is to enable
early self-other distinction within the sensorimotor system. Being able to run
predictive sensorimotor processes for both self and other selectively provides
the basis for the next step: enabling the mentalizing and mirroring system to
plan social actions towards achieving our communicative goal. This allows for
communicative signaling, in which a motor act (signal) is being strategically
adjusted in order to maximize the expected probability of successful reception.
As research into schizophrenia has shown, reliable and early self-other in-
tegration and distinction is important not only for the correct attribution of a
sense of agency, but also in turn for the correct attribution of intentions and
emotions in social interactions [4]. Two major mechanistic models of self-other
integration and distinction have been identified. One model, which makes use
of people’s ability to precisely predict the sensory consequences of their own
actions, allows to decrease the intensity of incoming signals by “sensory attenu-
ation”, which enables people to distinguish between self-caused actions and their
outcomes and those actions and outcomes caused by others. Research even sug-
gests that sensory attenuation correlates with activation in the mirror neuron
system [4], and that such attenuation increases during interaction with other
people [5]. The second mechanism, which is also influenced by the prediction
of action-outcomes, allows for the integration of sensory signals from multiple
modalities during a “temporal binding window” [6], which selects perceived ac-
tions and their outcomes for integration as long as they occur within a narrow
temporal window. Because we have more experience in predicting our own body
that window is more narrow for own action-outcomes, than for other people’s
actions. Being able to make such a distinction allows people to monitor, infer
and distinguish between causal relations for own and other’s behavior.
How can these mechanisms work in unison to allow us to make such dis-
tinctions, even in situations where we simultaneously observe another person
perform an action while producing one ourselves?
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It is now widely agreed upon, that actions share a common representation
for production and perception. Of course, such a common representation is eco-
logical for the brain, since having to sustain multiple representations for one
action were quite costly, but also such a common coding can lead to problems
like interferences. Such interferences were observed when in a simultaneuous ac-
tion perception and production scenario where the perceived action would be
incongruous to the produced one, led to measurable interferences, as a slight
mix of the observed action with the produced one [7]. The previously mentioned
sensory attenuation can shed light on this effect, since it attenuates predicted
action-outcomes only to the degree that we trust the prediction of an action.
From a predictive processing perspective, the simultaneous incongruent percep-
tion and production of actions would probably lead to strong prediction error
signals [8], but a mechanism of sensory attenuation for self-caused predicted
action-outcomes can minimize the influence of such a prediction error. However,
the observable interferences still indicate that activations due to production or
perception can influence each other. Thus, by means of attenuation the sen-
sorimotor system is able to produce and get feedback for own actions while
simultaneously perceive actions of others.
This ability to distinguish between own and other’s behavior can inform pro-
cesses that infer beliefs about other people, i.e. a communicative intention that
I want an interlocutor to understand, and her behavior that gives me a clue
about her understanding of this. This inferred mental state of others, together
with my own mental state and a communicative goal, are information that can
be used to make following actions and their underlying communicative intent
maximally distinguishable from other possibly plausible interpretations, or to
compensate for noise. This can be done by communicative signaling as an at-
tempt to strategically alter one’s own action kinematics to better achieve the
communicative goal [9]. The concept of communicative (or strategic) signaling
entails the question on how such alterations are constructed. We will model sig-
naling on an exemplar based approach, where from a set of available actions a
selection is made to produce the most distinguishable.
These mentioned mechanisms for self-other distinction, and the resulting
ability to make communicative signaling alterations to own behavior are the next
steps to be implemented in our embodied hierarchical model of social behavior.
To then be able to achieve self-other distinction in our embodied motor sys-
tem and make use of the collected information, we plan to test and account for
four scenarios that involve embodied agents interacting in a simulated environ-
ment, and that require successively increasing abilities for self-other distinction
and signaling: In scenario 1, the system will just produce and perceive its own
action, to test whether attenuation and temporal binding are working properly.
Scenario 2 will test the system’s ability to basically face itself in a virtual mirror,
so that its own action-outcome and an identical, reflected action-outcome will
need to be distinguished. In scenario 3, the system will face a second system,
producing a similar, but not equal action, to test its ability to distinguishing
between action-outcomes of self and other, as well as to trigger communicative
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signaling. As in scenario 4, a similar setup will be used, but the second sys-
tem will produce a completely different action, to test the system’s ability to
distinguish both actions and trigger communicative signaling as well.
4 Outlook
We are confident that the next steps we have laid out here will propel research
towards an embodied hierarchical model of social behavior. We expect this model
to provide novel and detailed accounts for several predicted phenomena: First,
well known actions are less prone to interference from simultaneously perceived
actions. This is due to the increased attenuation for action-outcomes of well
known actions and the resulting decreased influence of prediction errors. Second,
an exemplar based approach to signaling will allow for a wide variety of possible
strategic signaling, which is only limited to the number of actions learned and
experienced by the system.
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